Introduction
The last few years have seen an outburst of bilateral and regional treaties in the field of international economic law, in general, and in international trade, in particular.
1 In contrast to the new world economic order contemplated by the founders of the Bretton Woods system and the GATT/WTO in the aftermath of World War II, which was to be based on the non-discriminatory and all-encompassing principles of Multilateralism, 2 we now have a fragmented multitude of bilateral and regional arrangements in most of the important fields of international economic regulation: international trade, international investment and international taxation. Even the United States of America, a former steadfast champion of multilateralism, which only in 1985 signed its first bilateral Free
Trade Agreement (with Israel), 3 is currently in a "signing spree" of such bilateral agreements, with the count now standing on no less than 37 countries with which the U.S.
has either signed or is in the process of negotiating an FTA. 4 Such agreements have become so widespread that all but one WTO member are now parties to one or more of them and it is estimated that more than half of world trade is now conducted under bilateral FTAs.
5
But bilateralism is not confined to trade regulation. In fact, in most other areas of international economic regulation it appears that bilateralism is the rule, and multilateralism the exception. In the field of international investment protection, the attempt by the OECD to create a Multilateral Investment Agreement (MAI) failed in 1998, 6 and instead we have today some 2,750 Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), with the number constantly on the rise. 7 Likewise, ideas on the creation of a multilateral framework for the coordination of international tax policy have remained mainly a topic of utopian academic dissertations or a limited option for a few regional groupings, while bilateral tax treaties are signed by the dozens each year and are estimated now to amount to some 2,800. 8 We are also starting to see beginnings of bilateralism in the area of intellectual property regulation 9 that traditionally was governed almost exclusively by multilateral treaties. The same is true in the field of government procurement where there is only a plurilateral agreement (under the auspices of the WTO) that is very fragmented by bilateral accords and strict reciprocity requirements, 10 and where independent bilateral agreements are now on the rise. This situation has generated a lively debate on the utility of such bilateral agreements, in particular in the field of international trade, known as the so-called "building blocks or stumbling blocks" debate.
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The conventional methodology utilized in this debate has been the economic costbenefit analysis. In the trade field this has meant to try to measure trade creation versus trade diversion and estimating their relative costs and benefits. This perspective, first developed by Jacob Viner in 1950, 12 has served ever since as the major framework for the debate on the utility and global welfare effects of bilateral and regional trade regimes, in comparison to the multilateral approach offered by the GATT/WTO system. Based on this approach, most academic scholars are critical of the new bilateralism and regionalism, which often results in only modest reduction of mutual trade barriers,
claiming that it often causes more trade diversion than trade creation. 13 An alternative perspective was offered by Wilfred Ethier in 1998, who argued that the Vinerian perspective is not the most useful means of analyzing the "new regionalism". 14 Rather, Ethier takes the view that this regionalism should be assessed in terms of assisting economies in transition to join the international trading system, in entrenching commitments to economic reform, and in distinguishing these countries from other candidates for foreign direct investment.
Ethier's perspective, however, concentrates mainly, as indicated by the title of his paper, on regionalism, and not on bilateral agreements concluded between countries in different geographical regions. 15 In his theory, the success of multilateral liberalization will increase trade between neighbours, which in turn will create further incentives to 11 This phrase was first coined by Jagdish Baghwhati in his The World Trading System at Risk (Princeton, 1991 Ethier's model is thus less suited to explain this "new bilateralism", as distinct from the more narrow phenomenon of regionalism.
Furthermore, both Viner's and Ethier's perspectives are confined to regimes of international trade, and do not deal with the wider phenomenon of bilateral and regional agreements on other economic issues.
Finally, and irrespective of any specific theoretical model, the academic community is generally very critical of the new trade bilateralism. It is seen as producing a "spaghetti bowl" of trade arrangements that creates division, lack of uniformity and unpredictability of the trading system and as enabling strong countries to take advantage of the weaker ones. 16 These arguments could to a large extent be applied also to other areas of international economic regulation.
There seems thus to be an ever growing gap between the prescriptions of scholarly writings and the actual reality of international economic regulation. This gap demands the question: If bilateralism is so bad -why is it so widespread? Perhaps bilateralism holds some significant advantages for states that existing theoretical frameworks fail to take account of? This paper therefore proposes a different perspective on the debate, one that is applicable to all fields of international economic regulation and that can help us to both understand the attractiveness of bilateralism and still provide us with a framework within which we can assess when it should yield to multilateralism.
The perspective that I would like to develop in this paper is modelled after the Subsidiarity Principle. While this principle has mainly been used in the context of allocation of authority between various levels of government in federal or quasi-federal systems of government, in particular within the European Union, this paper proposes to use it in the analysis of the various layers of international law and in relation to the choice of bilateral, regional or plurilateral regimes over multilateral ones. As a result of globalization, increased economic interdependence and the proliferation of all kinds of international regimes, the world scene is becoming more in need of international coordination and the model that is evolving is one of multi-level governance.
International law and institutions create the framework and limits for the economic policies of national governments, and much of the decision-making is taking place today on the international level. The proliferation of international adjudication and the rapid growth of international economic law in the last decades reflect the worldwide recognition that the economic efficiency and political legitimacy of economic markets depend on law and institutions limiting market failures as well as political failures. On this background there has also been a growing literature on the need for "multilevel constitutionalism". 17 This connotes regulation of both vertical and horizontal relationships. While under the former, one would include the relationships between the state and international organizations, and between domestic law and international law, under the latter we refer to the relationship between various international regimes, such as multilateral trade agreements and environmental conventions, or between bilateral, regional and multilateral trade regimes. Thus, the introduction of the concept of Subsidiarity originating from federalist and European Union constitutional discourse could be very appropriate to the realm of international economic law and the various levels on which it is and ought to be regulated.
Such an analysis can provide both a normative criterion as well as an explanatory tool in relation to the reality of booming bilateralism. The objective of the paper is to develop parameters analogous to those used in the federalist discourse but adapted to the subject matter of international economic law. These parameters will incorporate both the efficiency rationales of the Subsidiarity principle, as well as its political and ethical rationales.
One of the advantages of the perspective introduced here is that it allows us to address bilateralism as a general phenomenon in international economic law (and perhaps in other areas too, although this will not be done in this article) and not only in to transfer all their powers to the Community, and to the extent that the Community has used these powers, only its institutions can act. In areas of concurrent competences, however, where the Treaty has granted non-exclusive powers to the Community, here the question may arise whether the Community should act on behalf of all Member States, or whether each state shall be free to act on its own in regulating this specific area. This is where the Treaty requires to act according to the subsidiarity principle. Nevertheless, as a political norm it would seem that subsidiarity has gained significance that transcends its legal confines. It often features in the political discussions on the proper division of powers within the Community, as a counterweight to excessive centralization. It was also part of the failed Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 28 as well as of the Treaty of Lisbon, which, if ratified, will strengthen the principle significantly. For Community action to be justified, both aspects of the subsidiarity principle shall be met: the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by Member States' action in the framework of their 28 Proposal for Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, Article 9. By mentioning not only the Member States' level, but also the regional and local level, this proposed formula stresses the idea that it is not only the division of power between the Community and the Member States that is involved, but also between the Community and any other lower level of government, which may be capable to perform the task more efficiently. 29 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007, O.J. C 306, See in particular the amended Article 3b and Article 8c (to become Article 5 and 12 in the Consolidated Version) of the Treaty on European Union, which adopts the Constitutional Treaty language discussed in the previous footnote, and also empowers national parliaments with the task of ensuring compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. This creates for the first time a kind of political enforcement mechanism of the principle. While its employment is not very easy, it may nevertheless strengthen the deterrence effect against blunt violations of the principle. 30 The 2 nd Preamble to the Protocol on the Application of the Principle of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty.
national constitutional system and can therefore be better achieved by action on the part of the Community. 31 Thus, the Principle of Subsidiarity has been found by the EU and other multi-level systems of governance to be a helpful guide on questions of vertical division of powers, but more as a political, rather than legally enforceable, principle.
32 Its ethical rationale is based on the idea that it unjust and wrong to deprive the individual, or a society of individuals from their rights and powers to take care of their own business and organize their lives as they see fit, unless there are solid justifications for allocating the power to a higher instance. The economic rationale of the principle is based on the idea that often decisions taken closer to the people are more attuned to their needs and circumstances, different climate, social, political or economic conditions, and therefore are more likely to achieve efficient outcomes. Only if one can show that there are efficiencies to gain from unity or harmonization, or other economies of scale that can only be attained at a higher, more central level, is action on the more central level economically justified.
These rationales would seem to be equally relevant to other types of multi-level governance systems, such as the current system of international organizations and agreements governing global economic relations. This possibility will be explored in the next chapters.
Bilateralism versus Multilateralism: Applying the Principle of Subsidiarity
Unlike GATT Art. XXIV, where the point of departure, and the rule, is multilateralism and the exception is bilateralism and regionalism, 33 under the 31 Ibid., para. 5. The Protocol also sets out guidelines on how to implement the subsidiarity principle. 32 There are varying views on whether Subsidiarity is a legally enforceable principle, which should be subject to judicial supervision of the Court of Justice. See Shachor-Landau, supra note 19, 326-327; A.G. Toth, 'A Legal Analysis of Subsidiarity', in O'Keefe and Twomey (eds), Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty (1994) 37; Josephine Steiner, "Subsidiarity under Maastricht", ibid., p. 62. While the Court has given some guidance as to how the principle should be interpreted, it has been reluctant to interfere with Community action, and has until now rejected all attempts to challenge the Commission's assertion that Community action is required in a particular area. 33 As explained in the introduction, the GATT/WTO regime is based on the non-discriminatory and allencompassing principles of Multilateralism. This is reflected in particular in GATT Article I, which European Community ("EC") Treaty Art. 5 (at least in areas of concurrent competence) the point of departure and default is that action shall be taken on the regional-Member State level. 34 The principle has two prongs: one negative and one positive. The negative prong refers to the ability of the individual Member States to achieve the objectives of the proposed action. Only if they cannot achieve these objectives "sufficiently", the Community may take action. Here, then, the focus is on the lower level, the one closer to the people. We must ask ourselves whether perhaps the objectives of the proposed action are better achieved not on the multilateral, more central, level, but on a lower, more regional level, closer to where the problem lies, by each Member States acting alone as it finds fit. The positive prong is the other side of the coin; it refers to the ability of the EC or any community of states -the level where requires every WTO member to accord immediately and unconditionally to all other WTO members most favoured nation (MFN) treatment in relation to all its import and export policies. The main exception to this rule is found in GATT Article XXIV which relates to bilateral and regional free trade arrangements (such as free trade areas and customs unions). This provision permits WTO members to conclude such arrangements -even though they depart from the principle of non-discriminatory MFN treatment by granting duty-free access and other benefits to their respective parties but not to other WTO members. However, in order to qualify under Article XXIV, the bilateral free trade arrangement must meet certain conditions, and in particular: (1) that it does not result in higher duties or more restrictive trade barriers towards the other WTO members than existed before the arrangement was concluded; (2) that the free trade arrangement applies "to substantially all the trade" between its parties; and (3) that free trade between its parties is implemented within "a reasonable length of time". While it is true that the Article XXIV exception has been very widely used, especially in the last few years, in order to permit the conclusion of bilateral and regional free trade arrangements, formally the rule is still multilateralism, whereas bilateralism and regionalism is only permitted when these specific conditions are met. The rationale of this exception, as explained in Article XXIV:4, is that the WTO members "recognize the desirability of increasing freedom of trade by the development, through voluntary agreements, of closer integration between the economies of the countries parties to such agreements." In other words, they recognize that the WTO as a multilateral regime is unable to reach such close integration of economies as can be reached in a free trade arrangement, and they do not want to stand in the way of two or more countries who want to achieve such close integration, even if the price is the departure from, and a certain erosion of, the MFN principle. 34 "…the Community shall take action… only if and insofar etc.". It is of course true that in the EC, the sub-central point of departure applies only in areas which do not fall within the Community's exclusive competence, and that in the many areas in which the Community does have such competence the point of departure (as well as the point of destination…) is Community, i.e., multilateral, action, whereas GATT Art. XXIV does not have such a qualification. However, this reflects a political decision of the EC Member States on how far they want the Principle of Subsidiarity to apply, and not on the Principle itself. This decision may be understood as reflecting an irrebuttable presumption by the Member States that in areas within the Community's exclusive competence, the objectives of a proposed action will always be deemed to be better achieved by the Community than by Member States. Or it may simply reflect the more farreaching integrationist objective of the EC, in comparison to the GATT/WTO, and the recognition by the EC Member States that in order to achieve this objective, the Principle of Subsidiarity must be limited to areas of concurrent competence only. Be that as it may, our discussion relates to the Principle of Subsidiarity as such, in the abstract, based on its ethical and efficiency rationales as set out in the previous chapter, and its possible positive and normative application to the choice of regime in international economic law.
all the member states act together, multilaterally (and in the case of the EC -supranationally) -to better achieve the objectives of the proposed action, by reason of its scale and effects. Here we must focus on the multilateral level, and ask ourselves if there are special reasons which demand and justify common, coordinated action on this level in order to better achieve the task. For Community action to be justified, both aspects of the Subsidiarity principle must be met: the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by Member States' action in the framework of their national constitutional system and they can be better achieved by Community action. 35 The Subsidiarity perspective is thus in effect turning the GATT Art. XXIV perspective on its head, and instead of requiring a special justification for a bilateral agreement, 36 it requires justification for an exclusive multilateral approach.
I shall also divide my discussion of bilateralism and multilateralism along these two prongs. First, I shall focus on the regional level, i.e., on bilateralism 37 , and ask 
The First Prong: The Advantages of Bilateralism (A) Enables the Conclusion and Design of Regimes According to the Needs and

Interests of the State
Bilateralism allows governments to conclude the types of agreements they need and want and to choose their partners to such agreements. It enables them to design such 35 Paragraph (5) of the Subsidiarity Protocol, supra note 30. 36 See supra note 33. 37 For the sake of brevity I will sometimes use the term "bilateralism" to include any approach that is not multilateral, whether regional or bilateral arrangements in the way that best suits their needs and interests. 38 This is the most essential rationale for the Subsidiarity Principle and for decentralization -taking decisions as close as possible to the people, where actions can be best designed to meet the needs of the constituents of the unit taking the decision. Multilateral agreements, in contrast, will have to target some ambiguous and sometimes elusive common denominator of the many national interests involved. Often, this tends to be the lowest common denominator of all the countries involved as a result of the need to reach a political consensus among the participants. Also, the negotiation and drafting process is usually dominated by the large and powerful countries, whereas the small countries have almost no ability to influence the outcome of multilateral negotiations. At most, they can create groupings in order to represent at least some of their interests, a process that also often involves compromises between themselves, even before the actual process of bargaining and compromising with the larger countries.
Applied to the area of trade liberalization this would mean, that if, for example, two countries with similar levels of economic development and with a neo-liberal economic ideology want to conclude a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) that will move them into a system of complete elimination of all trade barriers and deeper integration between their economies, armed with the Subsidiarity perspective, we must ask ourselves why they shouldn't be entitled to do so? Why do they have to be dependent on some elusive consensus of a group of over 150 countries of very different levels of economic development and diverging socio-economic philosophies? Thus, when it was decided to incorporate Article XXIV into the GATT, this can be seen as a recognition of the sovereign rights of two or more countries to conduct the foreign trade policy that is most in line with their own convictions and needs, as long as this is a trade promoting policy that does not cause too much harm to third countries.
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Likewise, developing countries are permitted to conclude preferential bilateral deals 38 However, see argument to the contrary in circumstances of unequal bargaining powers; infra paragraph 5(5). 39 For example, one of the conditions of GATT Art. XXIV is that the duties and other trade barriers towards third parties "shall not on the whole be higher or more restrictive" than those that were in place prior to the conclusion of the free trade agreement. See supra note 33.
with other countries even if they do not entail complete liberalization of "substantially all trade" and establishment of an FTA. 40 Indeed, from the perspective of Subsidiarity we need to understand why only certain bilateral trade agreements are allowed and not others. In order to justify such a rule, it has to be shown how the goals of international trade promotion and global welfare will be better served by limiting the "freedom of contract" and sovereignty of nations and embracing multilateralism.
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Another example is bilateral tax treaties. These reflect the nature and interests of the two countries that have signed them, in relation to their own tax systems, and how they foresee the flow of trade, capital, investments and people between their two countries. For instance, a country interested in encouraging its residents to invest abroad, will provide them with a generous exemption for foreign tax income, while a country interested in discouraging such investment, in order to leave more capital at home, will not provide any such exemption, or will grant only a tax deduction, instead of an exemption. Conversely, a country's willingness to exempt foreign investors from taxes on income derived in their country will depend on the extent of its need and interest in attracting foreign investment. These various needs and interests will be reflected in the different terms of the bilateral tax treaties. Usually, small countries' interest is to exempt foreign investors from taxes in order to attract investment even at the expense of foregone tax revenues. 42 In big and strong economies, the need to attract foreign investment by using tax incentives may be less acute, and hence the government will prefer not to forego tax revenues generated by such investment. These and other considerations will also determine which "residency" or "source rules" a country will choose. A bilateral approach will allow a country to assess its own needs and interests vis a vis another country with its potential investors, potential investment opportunities and domestic tax regime, and reach a conclusion on whether it would like to sign a tax treaty with this country and, 40 Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 1, at 471-506 41 Some of these justifications will be discussed below in Section 5 under "the Advantages of Multilateralism".
if so, which type of treaty. A multilateral tax treaty, in contrast, with uniform "onesize-fits-all" provisions would be unable to reflect these different needs and interests.
As 
(B) Only Bilateral Agreements Provide Full Reciprocity
When one state negotiates an agreement with another state, it will bargain for whatever advantages it can extract from the other party. It will presumably sign the agreement only after obtaining those advantages that will make its own commitments to that party worthwhile. Such specific reciprocity is possible only in bilateral deals.
In multilateral bargaining, as has been noted by Keohane in the international trade context, the reciprocity is more diffuse. Thus, a country that is keen on opening up a market in a certain foreign country for its exporters, but is unwilling to extend the concessions that will be required from it in return to all the other WTO members, will have no other choice than to enter into a bilateral negotiation with that other country with the aim of concluding a free trade agreement with it, outside the realm of the WTO.
The problem of diffuse reciprocity can be found in other areas of international regulation, as well. A country joining the plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement, for instance, is often required to extend equal access to its government contracts for suppliers from foreign countries in which its own suppliers may be very unlikely to ever win a contract (e.g., due to the nature of its industry and type of comparative advantage). If only a bilateral option was on the table, it is unlikely that such a country would sign a procurement agreement with these specific partners.
However, as part of a multilateral deal, it has no choice but to either accept or reject 46 Robert O. Keohane, "Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research" International Organization 45(4) (1990).
the entire package of mutual obligations and rights towards all of the parties of the agreement.
(C) Bilateral Agreements are Easier to Conclude
It is also much easier to negotiate and conclude a bilateral agreement with likeminded partners than with 153 WTO members of widely varying levels of development, economic interests and political constrains. Thus, even if we were to assume that the problems raised in the previous sections did not exist, and that a state could realize all its aspirations by the conclusion of a certain multilateral agreement, there would still remain one serious problem: it is extremely difficult to reach the necessary consensus in order to conclude such an agreement, and therefore in many cases it remains a desirable, but unattainable, goal. Principle would thus provide both an explanation and -at least to a certain extent -a justification for such bilateral action.
The Second Prong: The Advantages of Multilateralism, or When
Multilateralism is needed
Having concluded our analysis of the first prong of the Subsidiarity Principle, we shall now turn to the second prong, where we must ask ourselves if there are special reasons which demand and justify common, coordinated action on the multilateral level, as opposed to the bilateral level, in order to better achieve the task at hand.
Here we need to turn our attention to the disadvantages and weaknesses of bilateralism and other fragmented approaches, in relation to multilateral action.
(A) The Classic Vinerian Argument: Bilateral, Preferential Trade Arrangements Cause Inefficient Trade Diversion
The Subsidiarity perspective will also take into account the classic Vinerian argument in favour of multilateral trade agreements, but it will do so along with other relevant arguments, such as those elaborated in the previous section under the first prong, and within a more encompassing framework. Indeed, as shown by Jacob Viner, multilateral, non-discriminatory trade arrangements are more effective in ensuring efficient allocation of manufacturing resources. 56 By requiring equal treatment to all imports, a multilateral approach such as that espoused by the general Most Favoured 56 Viner, supra note 12, 53-54.
Nation obligation of GATT Article I, ensures that these resources will be allocated to the most efficient foreign producer. In contrast, preferential arrangements, such as a bilateral FTA, may result in a price advantage for a less-efficient producer established in an FTA country, over a more efficient foreign producer that happens to be established in a country with no FTA with the importing country in question, and thus manufacturing resources will be inefficiently allocated to the former producer (a phenomenon known as "trade diversion"). Hence the advantage of multilateral action in achieving global efficiency and raising worldwide standards of living.
This argument, however, can be met with a contra-argument: "Yes, but discrimination between domestic and foreign products is still permitted under the GATT/WTO multilateral regime (by import tariffs and subsidies, in the case of and only the trade creation remains. 57 The GATT/WTO regime does not require the abolition of custom duties, only that the parties respect the principle of MFN and do not exceed the levels of duties they have committed to under their respective tariff schedules. Domestic subsidies, i.e., those paid to the domestic industry irrespective of whether they export or not, are also 
Solutions with No Defections
Another category of circumstances which may require multilateral action are those that involve Prisoner's Dilemma situations. Some problems require fully coordinated solutions, with no defection by any party. One example of such circumstances is the fight against international money laundering. If only one or more countries -but not allimpose anti-laundering regulations on their banks, the money launderers will move their activity to banks with no such regulations. Thus, the countries that imposed these regulations would be hurting their own banking industry, by taking away from them a considerable amount of business, but without really solving the global problem of money laundering. The money laundering would continue through banks in other countries, and the criminal activities which the anti-laundering regulations were meant to combat and choke will continue uninterruptedly. Assuming that there are no costs to the hosting country from the laundering itself (for instance in the form of other "spillover" criminal activities that because of the laundering activity will also take place within its territory), but only gains, you would therefore not expect to find a bilateral or even plurilateral agreement against money laundering. Indeed, reality shows that this fight is carried out by a multilateral strategy aimed at all countries, with no exceptions. It is done through a multilateral body named the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 60 which was founded in 1989 by the G7. 61 Since, as explained, there is a strong incentive for any country to cheat on the rules of such a regime in order to attract large sums of capital to their banks, the regime needs a strong enforcement and deterrence mechanism against cheating. The FATF has managed to establish such a mechanism through the use of blacklisting of non- 60 The purpose of the FATF is to develop policies to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The FATF Secretariat is housed at the headquarters of the OECD in Paris. Since its creation the FATF has spearheaded the efforts to adopt and implement measures designed to counter the use of the financial system by criminals. It established a series of Recommendations in 1990 and revised them in 1996 and in 2003 in order to ensure that they remain up to date and relevant to the evolving threat of money laundering. The recommendations set out the basic framework for anti-money laundering efforts and are intended to be of universal application, not just to the members of the Task Force. 61 G7 is short for "the Group of 7" (today known as G8) and is an international forum for the large economies of the world, which at the time included the states: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States; For more on the FATF project of the OECD see: www.fatfgafi.org.
cooperative countries, which results in significant financial pressure on them and a de facto boycott of banks and financial institutions located in such countries. Thus, the success of this international initiative was due to its ability to establish an effective multilateral regime, which no state could afford to violate. International Business Transactions. 64 Until today it has 37 signatories, and the OECD makes efforts to enforce it by conducting and publishing individual country monitoring and follow-up. The effectiveness of the convention could of course benefit from getting more countries to join its ranks, but the OECD -as an organization of mainly developed states -lacks the ability to press more countries into joining. Therefore, this important task of combating corruption has lately been taken up by the United Nations itself, which in 2003 launched the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC). 65 To a certain extent, the problem of trade-distorting subsidies, in particular export subsidies, could also be seen as involving a prisoner's dilemma situation, and therefore require a multilateral regime. While from a purely economic perspective, the granting of subsidies is usually bad for the granting state's economy, causing inefficient allocation of its own resources, and creating -as Adam Smith pointed out 66 -a supposedly productive activity that consumes more than it produces -in practice, because of various political market failures, many national governments believe that subsidization of certain sectors and activities is in their interest (for instance, agriculture).
There are some specific sectors where this may in fact be true. For instance, if subsidization can be used in a strategic manner in order to eliminate competitors, who because of high entry barriers will be precluded from re-entry, it may capture an industry niche and thus benefit the subsidizer's economy. 67 Based on such a strategy, these subsidies will also pose a prisoner's dilemma. Take for instance the case of export subsidies, where the industries of several countries compete for the same export markets. A similar pattern can be found with regards to product standards.
(E) Unequal Bargaining Power
A final reason to prefer multilateral action is in circumstances where bilateral action will
give unfair advantages to the stronger party to the negotiations, and lead to suboptimal outcomes either from a distributive justice or efficiency perspective. In such situations, multilateral negotiations that allow weaker countries -such as developing and least 
Conclusions
As we have seen, the subsidiarity principle provides a more balanced and comprehensive perspective on the problems associated with the 'spaghetti bowl' of bilateral and regional economic agreements, that many see as threatening to unravel the gains of the post-World War II multilateral trading system. Subsidiarity as an organizing principle could be more effective than the current regime -GATT Article XXIV -in regulating the relationship between the WTO and regional trade agreements, because it would optimize the advantages of both regionalism and multilateralism. Bilateral and regional agreements have many advantages that are foregone within the multilateral system: They are more sensitive to the particular needs and interests of states and allow decisions to be taken on a level closer to the people, they enable full reciprocity without 'free-riding', they are easier to negotiate and consummate, they can address technological change and shorter product cycles faster than the WTO, they provide efficient signaling to other participants in the multilateral system and to investors, and they are convenient platforms for political agreements. Multilateralism, on the other hand, is needed for other, complementary reasons that are not necessarily contradictory: It prevents trade diversion, overcomes cooperation problems, optimizes global economies of scale, provide uniform standards and 'language', and balances asymmetrical bargaining power. The subsidiarity approach would turn GATT Article XXIV on its head, by making bilateral arrangements the default, with multilateralism being engaged only where the goals could not be attained on a regional or bilateral basis. However, the Subsidiarity perspective can be applied to more than just agreements on lowering of tariffs. In the text above, we have applied it to several other fields of international economic regulation, such as subsidies, government procurement, foreign investment, money laundering, corrupt practices, labour and environmental standards, and intellectual property. In that, it is also more comprehensive 83 [References] than the Ethier perspective, which only explains the existence of regional trade agreement -not bilateral agreements between non-neighbouring countries, such as those that we have seen much of in the last few years, nor bilateral agreements in other economic areas.
